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 Non-technical summary 
Social norms are increasingly acknowledged in economic analysis to be part of the 
restrictions which should be taken account for a full understanding of observable 
behavioural patterns. However, in the field of public finance only a gradual inclusion of 
prevalent norms in explanatory approaches is taking place. Whereas tax morale, for 
example, has attracted growing attention in attempts to explain observable tax 
compliance other norms relevant for public finances have been neglected. This is 
particularly relevant for social norms with relevance for the functioning of the welfare 
state. This study contributes to overcome that gap. 
Social norms can be expected to be of large importance for the costs of welfare state 
institutions. Generous support systems for the unemployed are less costly if people see it 
as their obligation to care for themselves or attach a “stigma” to the acceptance of 
benefits. Conversely, the emergence of transfer dependency as an accepted model of 
economic life would make a given benefit scheme more expensive both in fiscal terms 
and with regard to the relevance of labour supply disincentives. For example, social 
norms about the use of social benefits may affect the tendency to apply for social 
assistance, job search intensity and the level of reservation wages, workers’ absenteeism 
or applications for early retirement.  
The dynamics of benefit morale which had been touched upon only casually in the few 
empirical studies on benefit morale is a particular interesting and important aspect. A 
stable downward trend in benefit morale would be a serious concern for the stability of 
the welfare state which anyhow faces increasing challenges from ageing and global 
competition. In a number of contributions, Assar Lindbeck and co-authors have pointed 
out that the welfare state due to “hazardous dynamics” may “destroy its own economic 
foundation”. One of the channels Lindbeck identifies is the impact the welfare state itself 
has on benefit morale. In essence, he fears that a generous welfare state undermines the 
very social norms which are indispensable for its proper functioning. It is the objective of 
this paper to study the empirical contents of Lindbeck’s hypothesis and to contribute to a 
better understanding of the dynamics of benefit morale. On the basis of results from the 
World Value Survey the question is addressed whether a country’s welfare state history 
determines its present degree of benefit morale.  
The results support Lindbeck’s concerns: The build-up of the welfare state and increasing 
unemployment tend to impair relevant ethical standards. The presented empirical findings 
clearly indicate that Assar Lindbeck’s theory on self-destructive welfare state dynamics 
has empirical backing. Social norms which safeguard the welfare state’s stability and limit 
its costs appear to be influenced by the welfare state’s history. Specifically, transfer 
expansion or increasing unemployment tend to be associated with a larger readiness of 
the country’s population to cheat on benefits. These findings have implications for the 
 design of welfare state reforms. Furthermore, they highlight the risk that conventional 
empirical approaches to measure the incentive effects of welfare state arrangements may 
underestimate the strength of incentive effects in the long-run. 
With regard to welfare state reforms the conclusion is that the large variance in benefit 
morale must not be ignored in the design of reform options for the welfare state. An 
imitation of institutions which have proven viable in countries with high ethical standards 
can fail in a country with low ethical standards. Therefore, different social norms have to 
be taken into account in reflections on imitation strategies based on learning from 
successful countries. A further conclusion is that the problem of a potential “welfare state 
overshoot” as identified theoretically by Lindbeck may indeed be relevant empirically: If 
only short-run incentive effects are accounted for in the decision on the build-up of 
welfare state arrangements then the long-run costs of the welfare state are 
underestimated. The decision based on the short-run calculus will then be more generous 
than it would be the case if the optimizing calculus was based on a full account of all (also 
the long-run) behavioural reactions which result from the welfare state’s gradual impact 
on social norms. 
Besides these economic policy insights methodological conclusions emerge. Standard 
microeconometric approaches targeted at the quantification of incentive effects are based 
on the implicit assumption of stable social norms. E.g., in the context of labour markets 
normative restrictions with regard to the take-up of social benefits are treated as 
exogenously given. This study stresses the problem that this ceteris paribus assumption 
is empirically not valid. If transfers undermine those norms which support a reluctant take-
up of government benefits then the negative effects of transfers on labour supply are 
more pronounced than it can be measured in the standard microeconometric exercises.  
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Abstract  
Assar Lindbeck has pointed to the problem that generous welfare state institutions may in 
the long-run undermine those social norms which limit the costs and incentives effects of 
the welfare state and thus guarantee its viability. This study is the first to assess the 
empirical validity of Lindbeck’s notion by assessing the long-run link between the welfare 
state and social norms with regard to the honest take-up of government benefits. Based 
on the results of four waves of the World Value Surveys the determinants of benefit 
morale – defined as the reluctance to claim government benefits without legal entitlement 
– are analysed. Besides a standard list of the respondents’ individual characteristics, 
macroeconomic indicators describing a country’s long-run welfare state and labour 
market history are included. The results support the empirical validity of Lindbeck’s 
theory: An increase of government benefits and unemployment is in the long-run  
associated with deteriorating welfare state ethics.  
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1 Introduction 
In public economics it has become popular to take account of social norms in order to 
better understand the functioning of institutions. Increasingly, it is accepted that common 
habits and values must not be ignored to understand the behaviour of citizens for 
example with regard to the observable degree of tax compliance (Torgler, 2002). 
Obviously, citizens in many public policy contexts do not act as if they were maximizing 
their narrow self-interest without paying tribute to society’s views on what is an 
acceptable behaviour. 
Social norms can be expected to be particularly relevant for the effectiveness of the 
welfare state. Generous support systems for the unemployed are less costly if people see 
it as their obligation to care for themselves or attach a “stigma” to the acceptance of 
benefits. Conversely, common views that everybody has a moral right to receive 
government benefits or the emergence of transfer dependency as a normal model of 
economic life would make a given benefit scheme more expensive both in fiscal terms 
and with regard to the relevance of labour supply disincentives. For example, social 
norms about the use of social benefits may affect the tendency to apply for social 
assistance, job search intensity and the level of reservation wages, workers’ absenteeism 
or applications for early retirement (Lindbeck, 1995a).  
While a substantial body of literature has evolved with regard to tax morale, benefit 
morale so far is an empirically largely neglected issue. Algan and Cahuc (2005) and Halla 
and Schneider (2005) are rare exceptions. Algan and Cahuc (2005) study benefit morale 
in the context of the debate on European reform models for the labour market. They 
stress the fact that the prevalent civic attitudes with regard to claiming government 
benefits are an important restriction when a country chooses and adapts its labour market 
institutions. On the basis of empirical insights from the World Value Surveys, the authors 
look at the much discussed Danish model which combines low standards of employment 
protection with high standards of unemployment benefits. They argue that this “flexicurity” 
model fits well to the outstandingly high benefit morale of the Danes but would be 
inappropriate for countries where a much larger share of the population is willing to cheat 
on benefits. The authors conclude that country factors are much more important to 
understand an individual’s morale than standard socio-economic factors and link these 
country effects to “culture”. In their analysis, Algan and Cahuc do not look at evolution of 
benefit morale over time and, implicitly, regard the country factors as stable. 
For Austrian survey data, Halla and Schneider (2005) contrast the determinants of benefit 
morale with that of tax morale. According to their results, age and employment status 
affect benefit but not tax morale. Family status, religion, education, income and trust in 
the legal system are among the significant drivers of tax morale, but not of benefit morale. 
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Furthermore, the results indicate that benefit morale indeed affects the degree to which 
benefits are claimed without justification whereas the link between tax morale and actual 
tax evasion is less clear cut. The authors also mention that, in general, benefit morale 
had deteriorated in Austria over the nineties while tax morale was stable, however, 
without paying attention to explanations behind that dynamics. 
The dynamics of benefit morale which had been touched upon only casually in the few 
empirical studies on benefit morale is a particular interesting and important aspect. A 
stable downward trend in benefit morale would be a serious concern for the stability of 
the welfare state which anyhow faces increasing challenges from ageing and global 
competition. In a number of contributions, Assar Lindbeck and co-authors (Lindbeck, 
1995a,b; Lindbeck et al., 1999; Lindbeck and Nyberg, 2006) have pointed out that the 
welfare state due to “hazardous dynamics” may “destroy its own economic foundation” 
(Lindbeck, 1995a, 9). One of the channels Lindbeck identifies is the impact the welfare 
state itself has on benefit morale. In essence, he fears that a generous welfare state 
undermines the very social norms which are indispensable for its proper functioning.  
It is the objective of this paper to study the empirical contents of Lindbeck’s hypothesis 
and to contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics of benefit morale. On the 
basis of results from the World Value the question is addressed whether a country’s 
welfare state history determines its present degree of benefit morale.  
The results support Lindbeck’s concerns: The build-up of the welfare state and increasing 
unemployment tend to impair relevant ethical standards. The findings suggest that long-
run fiscal cost and disincentive effects of any welfare state expansion are more 
substantial than short-run effects. Hence, disincentives as measured in standard micro-
econometric approaches may underestimate the long-run severity of the problem. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: In section 2 the theoretical arguments proposed 
by Lindbeck and others on the potential drivers of benefit morale are developed and 
testable hypotheses with a particular focus on the long-run dynamics are derived. Section 
3 includes some descriptive evidence on the link between the history of a country’s 
welfare state and the benefit morale of its population. Section 4 presents the results of 
econometric testing combining socio-economic characteristics with welfare state related 
and other country effects among the determinants of individual benefit morale in OECD 
countries. Section 5 concludes. 
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2 The dynamics of welfare state social norms: theory 
Social norms can constrain the behaviour of agents because breaking such norms 
creates discomfort (Parsons, 1952, Lindbeck, 1995b). These psychological costs of 
breaking unwritten rules can explain that people do not steal, do not evade taxes or do 
not cheat on benefits even if from a narrow rational view this would constitute optimizing 
behaviour given low detection probabilities and limited sanctions. Hence, social norms 
with regard to the welfare state which, for example, imply a high esteem for transfer 
independence provide a normative check against disincentive effects in a social transfer 
system.  
Welfare state norms need not be stable over time. In his analysis of “hazardous welfare-
state dynamics”, Lindbeck (1995a,b) points to possible processes over which a more 
generous welfare state can  - in the long run – have a detrimental impact on these norms. 
From the individual perspective, the introduction of more generous transfer schemes will 
make it more expensive to stick to any established norm which implies a negative 
valuation of receiving benefits1. This may have no immediate consequences for the large 
majority of people but some individuals could abandon the dominating habits, prove to be 
individually successful with this new type of behaviour and subsequently and steadily 
followed by imitators (Sugden, 1986). At a certain moment in this process a “critical mass” 
of people can be reached so that the social norm ceases to be supported in general 
because the perception of other citizens’ behaviour is being affected. Norms are 
supported by reciprocity: if an individual perceives that others (friends, neighbours, 
society as a whole) do not stick to that norm, that individual will be likely to abandon this 
norm as well.  
Lindbeck suspects that a macroeconomic shock can function as a catalyst to changing 
welfare state norms. Negative macroeconomic shocks generating a sudden hike in 
unemployment abruptly confronts a high number of individuals with different welfare 
systems and thus can create the critical mass of transfer recipients necessary to 
transform pre-existing social norms. This suggests that not the institutional characteristics 
of a welfare system alone but also the objective need of a large number of citizens to get 
help from these safety nets can be drivers of benefit morale. 
A further catalyst for changing norms according to Lindbeck’s exposition is generational 
change. Lindbeck suggests that each generation’s values and norms are created by the 
incentive structures in the specific generation’s younger years and that these convictions 
                                            
1 It is not essential whether the pre-existing social norm only implies a negative 
assessment of cheating on benefits or also a negative view even at claiming legally 
justified benefits. 
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tend to be relatively stable for the rest of any generation’s life. If this is so, the 
transformation of social norms as a consequence of an expansion of the welfare state will 
be substantially delayed because only with the socialization of new birth cohorts the 
change in values will materialize. In this context, Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006) point to the 
negative effect generous welfare state norms have on parents’ incentives to instill work 
norms in their children. In this sense the welfare state may have an impact on education 
and thus – with a time lag of a generation – affect behaviour of people of working age. 
If these negative and strongly delayed links between the welfare state itself and social 
norms on benefits are empirically valid this creates the problem of a “welfare overshoot” 
(Lindbeck, 1995a,b): Politicians who choose welfare state arrangements as a result of a 
short-run calculus will install more generous arrangements than they would if they took 
account of the long-run incentive effects. 
Lindbeck’s “hazardous welfare state dynamics” is open for empirical testing. Test 
strategies may be indirect or direct. Direct approaches look immediately into the drivers of 
social norms whereas indirect strategies check whether certain developments are 
consistent with an erosion of social norms driven by the welfare state’s generosity.  In a 
recent contribution, Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006) give an example of such an indirect 
testing strategy and link the decline in average hours worked in Europe since the mid-70s 
to the increasing generosity of welfare state arrangements which, with a considerable 
time lag, may have led to the erosion of work norms. 
Here, the direct approach is applied by a straightforward analysis of social norms and 
their determinants. Lindbeck’s theory implies that a country’s change in its population’s 
benefit morale should be affected by this country’s welfare state history. Countries having 
experienced a substantial build-up of transfers should also be countries with deteriorating 
benefit morale. Note that a negative contemporaneous correlation between the size of the 
welfare state and benefit morale cannot be expected. As Algan and Cahuc (2005) 
convincingly argue and show this contemporaneous correlation is rather positive because 
high benefit morale is a precondition that a generous social support system can be 
implemented. However, the expansion of the welfare state should according to 
Lindbeck’s theory impair the, initially, high social morale. Thus, a testable hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1:  The expansion of the welfare state over the last decades has led to lower 
levels of benefit morale over this period. 
Second, in addition to the evolution of welfare state institutions, unfavourable 
macroeconomic developments and increasing unemployment, in particular, should leave 
negative traces on benefit morale. 
Hypothesis 2: The change of unemployment over the last decades has had a negative 
impact on benefit morale over this period. 
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Third, if Lindbeck’s presumption about a specific welfare state norm in each generation 
holds there should be observable cohort effects corresponding to the build-up of the 
welfare state in industrial countries. Earlier birth cohorts should have higher levels of 
benefit morale than later ones. This cohort effect is logically different from a pure age 
effect which would mean that older have higher morale than younger independent from 
their birth year (see below). 
Hypothesis 3: Earlier birth cohorts of people who had been socialized before the massive 
build-up of the welfare state should have higher levels of benefit morale than later 
cohorts. 
While hypotheses 1-3 are the focus of this empirical analysis, further hypotheses on the 
potential impact of a number of individual- and country-specific control variables will be 
taken account of. The hypotheses with regard to individual-specific characteristics 
constitute a standard as it has emerged from the literature on the determinants of tax 
morale (e.g., Alm and Torgler, 2006) and as they have been also included in the few 
studies on benefit morale as mentioned above (see, in particular, Halla and Schneider, 
2005, for further discussion and literature on each of the hypotheses):  
− Gender: Females are regularly regarded as more compliant with explicit laws and 
social norms than males. 
− Age: Regularly, older people tend to be more honest than younger people. Reasons 
discussed include their higher social capital acquired in their life or their more intense 
attachment to their community.  
− Religion: Due to the high esteem for moral behaviour in almost all religions more 
religious people should also have higher levels of benefit morale. 
− Marriage: Married people are more constrained with regard to their social behaviour 
and their reflections on the validity of social norms than singles and, hence, should 
have a higher benefit morale. 
− Unemployment: Unemployment is an indicator of objective need to take up welfare 
benefits. It also is a proxy for the familiarity with a situation of being a benefit recipient. 
Hence, a reluctance to accept benefits is more expensive for unemployed than for the 
employed so that unemployment should be associated with a lower level of benefit 
morale.   
− Trust: Trust in a country’s institutions, be it the government, the parties, the legal 
system or the parliament, is conducive for cooperative behaviour as the vast literature 
on social capital has convincingly established. 
− Patriotism: Pride in a country supports the readiness to accept this country’s rules. As 
a consequence, a high degree of patriotism should also foster benefit morale. 
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− Income: While the theoretical impact of income on tax morale is ambiguous, there is a 
more straightforward link with regard to benefit morale: With rising income the 
opportunities to claim (justified or unjustified) government benefits are reduced. Thus, 
high benefit morale is less costly with high income. Income should, therefore, be a 
positive driver of benefit morale. 
− Financial satisfaction: A high degree of financial satisfaction should lead to higher 
benefit morale due to two reasons. First, high financial satisfaction in analogy to a 
high income makes benefit morale less costly. Second, it reduces the feeling of being 
treated in an unfair way by society and thus supports the acceptance of social norms 
based on reciprocity considerations (“if the society treats me fair I will keep the rules of 
that society”). 
 
3 A descriptive look at benefit morale 
The European and World Value Surveys (The European Values Study Foundation and 
World Values Survey Association, 2006) offer a rich database which allows to study the 
cross-section properties of dominant views on the welfare state as well as these views’ 
evolution over time. Currently four waves of surveys (wave 1: 1981-1984, wave 2: 1989-
1991, wave 3: 1995-1998 and wave 4: 1999-2001) are available. 
The question on benefit morale which stands in this study’s focus belongs to the standard 
list of questions which are covered in all waves and is formulated as follows: 
“Please tell me whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or 
something in between claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled”. 
Answers are given on a ten-point scale from 1 (“never justifiable”) to 10 (“ always 
justifiable”). 
It is debatable whether answers to this question can be expected to be always honest. 
However, Torgler and Werner (2005) defend the data quality with respect to the 
analogous question on the acceptability of “cheating on taxes”. They argue that due to 
the wide-ranging character of the survey people are not likely to be suspicious about the 
questions. Indeed, the question is put in a casual way as part of a long questionnaire 
covering a whole range of issues from religion to politics so that suspicion should be low 
that this question could be part of a administrative control measure. Furthermore, the 
question does not relate to actual behaviour so that people are not asked to confess to 
which extent they actually break normative rules or laws.  
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Since the WEVS also includes the standard socio-economic characteristics and questions 
concerning religious beliefs, confidence in a country’s institutions, the extent of pride in 
the own country and the degree of financial satisfaction it allows to include the above 
mentioned control variables in the empirical analysis (see Table 1 in the appendix).  
In order to search for the impact of a country’s welfare state on the change of benefit 
morale the data set is augmented by two macroeconomic variables. To each observation 
in the data set the relevant country’s 20-year-change in social security benefits paid by 
the government relative to GDP and its 20-year-change in the unemployment rate is 
assigned. The change in spending on social benefits is a comprising proxy for the 
evolution of the welfare state and, hence, allows testing hypothesis 1 whereas the 
change in the unemployment rate allows testing hypothesis 2. The 20-year-interval 
corresponds to the longest available time span of the WEVS data and reaches a length in 
line with the long-run character of Lindbeck’s considerations. 
Detrimental welfare state dynamics as they are discussed here are only a meaningful 
concept in the context of developed industrial countries locking back at a history with a 
welfare state which already has been present for decades. Therefore, the empirical 
analysis is confined to WEVS observations from OECD countries (for country coverage 
see table 2 in the appendix). 
Table 1 summarizes analyses of variance for the list of standard explanatory variables 
presented above. Obviously, all variables are significantly correlated with benefit morale 
with the sign corresponding to theoretical expectations. Thus, the reluctance to claim 
benefits without justification is positively correlated with age, attendance of religious 
services, confidence in the parliament, patriotism, income and financial satisfaction. In 
addition, it is higher for women than for men, for married than for unmarried and for 
employed than for unemployed persons. 
Table 2 summarizes the development of benefit morale over time for industrial countries. 
In a majority of countries, the acceptance of illegal benefit claims has increased. This 
erosion of social norms has been strongest in the case of Sweden. However, there are a 
number of countries with a remarkable stability of this particular social norm, among them 
Canada and Western Germany.  
Some of the changes over time are certainly driven by exceptional circumstances in the 
early 90s. For the Czech Republic and Hungary and, in particular, for Finland, extremely 
low levels of benefit morale have been measured in the World Value Survey’s second 
wave which could be related to the critical labour market situation in these countries in 
that time. This could cautiously be taken as case study evidence in favour of the view that 
macroeconomic shocks and job uncertainty impact on the degree of compliance with the 
welfare state’s rules.  
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Within Germany, benefit morale has converged between the western and the eastern part 
of the country. For Western Germany in the fourth wave, the indicator has even reached 
a higher level compared to the first wave. For Eastern Germany, a declining level was 
measured resulting in the fourth wave in a slightly lower level compared to Western 
Germany. This development is consistent with a view that the poor labour market 
situation in Eastern Germany and the increasing acquaintance with the rules of the 
welfare state have impaired benefit morale since unification. This type of convergence 
can be measured in an analogous way for tax morale in Germany (Halla und Schneider, 
2005). 
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Table 1: Analysis of variance for benefit morale: Individual characteristics 
Variable  Share of high 
benefit 
morale1 
Nb. 
observations 
F-test 
Gender Male 0.609 55,396  
 Female 0.645 60,694 160.34*** 
Age <=25 0.477 20,621  
 26-40 0.592 35,104  
 41-60 0.675 35,818  
 > 60 0.738 24,676 1314.61*** 
Attendance of 
religious 
services 
At least once a 
month 
0.657 39,888  
 Less frequently 0.610 73,007 244.7*** 
Marital status Married 0.671 68,156  
 Not married 0.567 46,700 1308.8*** 
Unemployment Unemployed 0.547 5,894  
 Not unemployed 0.632 106,064 170.9*** 
Confidence in 
Parliament 
Quite a lot or a 
great deal 
0.646 46,697  
 None at all or not 
very 
0.613 64,622 128.7*** 
Patriotism Very or quite 
proud about 
nationality 
0.642 94,805  
 Not very or not at 
all proud 
0.559 15,689 398.8*** 
Income Upper half of 
income shares 
0.630 39,440  
 Lower half of 
income shares 
0.619 55,689 11.5*** 
Financial 
satisfaction 
Upper half of 
satisfaction scale 
0.661 57,776  
 Lower half of 
satisfaction scale 
0.594 30,387 396.2*** 
1High benefit morale defined as answer “claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled is never 
justifiable”; ***: 1 percent significance level. 
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Table 2: Benefit morale* per country over time 
 Wave 
 1 2 3 4 
 1981-84 1989-1993 1994-1999 1999-2004 
Australia 0.740  0.739  
Austria  0.687  0.595 
Belgium 0.664 0.524  0.543 
Canada 0.612 0.695  0.714 
Czech Republic  0.497 0.454 0.650 
Denmark 0.896 0.808  0.833 
Finland  0.126 0.627 0.494 
France 0.389 0.383  0.408 
Greece    0.240 
Hungary 0.818 0.612 0.546 0.759 
Iceland 0.732 0.721  0.680 
Ireland 0.721 0.683  0.698 
Italy 0.827 0.658  0.649 
Japan 0.680 0.668 0.642 0.644 
Korea 0.630 0.770   
Luxembourg    0.457 
Mexiko  0.217 0.489 0.448 
Netherlands 0.818 0.736  0.775 
New Zealand   0.703  
Norway 0.803 0.794 0.709  
Poland  0.633 0.552 0.536 
Portugal  0.537  0.586 
Slovakia  0.426 0.340 0.374 
Spain 0.600 0.610 0.668 0.560 
Sweden 0.815 0.745 0.579 0.553 
Switzerland  0.732 0.618  
Turkey  0.831  0.898 
Great Britain 0.729 0.686  0.657 
United States 0.760 0.678 0.758 0.641 
West Germany 0.615 0.559 0.575 0.648 
East Germany  0.739 0.658 0.624 
*Respondents’ share of answer “claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled is never 
justifiable”; missing values: country not covered in the respective wave. 
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Looking at the correlation between the size of the welfare state and benefit morale 
counteracting effects have to be taken into consideration. As argued in the literature 
(Algan and Cahuc, 2005), the population’s readiness to comply with the rules of the 
system is a determinant of the system’s optimum generosity: Hence, countries with high 
ethical standards can afford to install more generous benefit schemes, an aspect 
suggesting a positive correlation. Contrary to that, Lindbeck’s “hazardous welfare 
dynamics” hint towards a negative correlation because the system’s degree of generosity 
impairs ethical standards of a country’s citizens. However, the latter aspect should result 
in a negative correlation of differences: Even if there is a positive correlation of the size of 
the welfare state and benefit morale a build-up of the welfare state should lead to a falling 
benefit morale in the long run. 
In order to look into these long-run links descriptively, 20-year-differences (or the 
maximum available time span given missing values in the WVS) of benefit morale and 
welfare state proxies are presented. A negative correlation can be detected for the 
differences of benefit morale and unemployment (Figure 2) but not for the differences of 
benefit morale and the ratio of social spending and GDP (Figure 1). Dropping the outlier 
Finland due to its exceptional circumstances as discussed the correlation between the 
20-year-changes of benefit morale and unemployment is -0.24 while the correlation is 
slightly positive in the case of the social spending ratio (+0.08 without Finland). This 
suggests that the unemployment channel is more important compared to the size of 
social spending for undermining welfare state norms. Thus, this first descriptive evidence 
rather supports hypothesis 2 than hypothesis 1. 
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Figure 1: Change in benefit morale and change social security benefits/GDP 
between 1980 and 2000 
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Figure 2: Change in benefit morale change in unemployment between 1980 and 
2000 
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A first descriptive plausibility check can also be applied with regard to hypothesis 3 which 
claims an impact of the year of birth on benefit morale in addition to a pure age effect. 
Figure 3 presents age dependent benefit morale – again defined as the share of 
respondents for which the illegal claim of government benefits is by no means justifiable – 
for four different birth cohorts and depending on the age of respondents. Thus, this 
depiction allows comparing people from different birth years at the same age. Where 
overlapping age profiles for different birth cohorts are available this helps to find out 
whether there are pure cohort effects. Indeed, this analysis supports the empirical 
relevance of hypothesis 3: The age profiles of different birth cohorts only have two 
intersections. Apart from these the age profile of the earlier cohort always runs above the 
age profile of later cohorts. Obviously, benefit morale is declining with an increasing year 
of birth – independently from age effects. Of course, this depiction is unable to prove 
whether this is related to the fact that earlier birth cohorts had been socialized in an 
environment of an infant welfare state. At least, however, these findings are not 
inconsistent with a key element of Lindbeck’s theory. 
 
Figure 3: Age profiles of benefit morale for different birth cohorts 
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Respondents’ mean share of answer “claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled is never 
justifiable”. Means only reported if a minimum of 100 observations in an age-cohort-combination. 
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4 Econometric evidence 
The descriptive insights above offer insightful plausibility checks but may be distorted by 
other determinants of benefit morale. In the following, regression evidence is presented 
taking account of the individual characteristics of respondents in addition to the country’s 
welfare state environment. The model is specified in the following way: 
(1) BMi = β0 + β1 Δ WELFAREC + β2 INDCTLi + β3 COUNTRYCTLC + β4 TD + εi 
(2) BMi = β0 + β1 Δ UNEMPLC + β2 INDCTLi + β3 COUNTRYCTLC + β4 TD + εi 
An individual’s benefit morale is modelled as a function of individual-specific control 
variables (INDCTL) and two types of country-specific characteristics: the country 
characteristics referring to Lindbeck’s theory (change in welfare state spending in 
equation 1 and change in unemployment in equation 2) and further country 
characteristics (COUNTRYCTL) depicting additional country features which may 
influence benefit morale priori. Finally the model allows for time fixed effects by including 
the time dummies TD identifying the World Value Survey’s wave. Country fixed effects 
are incompatible with the inclusion of non time-variant country characteristics. 
This model is tested on the basis of probit approach focusing on the top answer category 
of respective question in the World Value Survey (“claiming government benefits to which 
you are not entitled is never justifiable” versus other answers). All variables listed in Table 
1 are included as explanatory variables among the individual-specific characteristics with 
the exception of the variable “financial satisfaction” which is dropped due to too many 
missing observations. In order to test hypothesis 3 both the year of birth and the age of 
the respondent is included. With regard to the employment status different specifications 
of the relevant variable have been tried. Since a pure unemployment dummy did not 
show up significantly a modified dummy is included contrasting an employment situation 
with different forms of non-employment including unemployed, students, housewifes and 
retired persons.  
Δ WELFAREC is quantified as 20-year-difference of the ratio of social benefits to GDP and 
Δ UNEMPLC as 20-year-difference in the unemployment rate. Hence, a long-run definition 
is chosen which comes close to the idea of the theory that long-run changes are essential 
to undermine pre-existent social norms. 
A country’s welfare state and labour market history are not the only country factors which 
may impact on benefit morale. Hence, coefficients of “Lindbeck-variables” included in 
isolation could be influenced by omitted country variables. This risk is reduced by the 
additional inclusion of further country characteristics for which a link to the level of benefit 
morale can be expected. The following aspects are covered by the variables in 
COUNTRYCTL: 
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− Decentralization: The degree of a country’s decentralization is an important candidate 
in this context: In the context of tax morale a positive impact of decentralization has 
been indicated in the context of Switzerland (Torgler, 2004) and Germany (Torgler 
and Werner, 2005). The authors interpret the positive sign by referring to the closer 
interaction between citizens and the state fostering mutual trust and the willingness to 
obey to rules. In addition the classical fiscal federalism argument that decentralized 
structures allow a better match between voters’ preferences and public good provision 
should also lead to a more positive view of citizens on the government compared to 
highly centralized structures. Similar effects as in the case of tax morale cannot be 
excluded for the link between decentralization and benefit morale. Two 
decentralization indicators are included: A dummy for the existence of autonomous 
regions is taken from Beck et al. (2001) and a second indicator focusing on tax 
decentralization originates from Stegarescu (2005).  
− Legal origin: In a growing number of contributions a country’s legal origin is identified 
to be a determinant of the quality of institutions and of growth potential (La Porta et 
al., 1999). A country’s legal origin may also have a lasting impact on the way social 
norms with regard to keeping a country’s rule have developed in the long-run. Hence, 
this type of variables offers a further way to measure important country characteristics. 
− Other standard country-specific variables: Both the geographical position and the 
degree of ethnic fractionalization play a certain role in cross-section studies of growth 
potential or quality of government (La Porta et al., 1999; Alesina and Ferrara, 2005). 
Hence, these variables are included as further country-specific control variables 
without having strong a priori expectations about these variables’s impact on benefit 
morale. Here, the geographical position is measured as latitude and specifically as the 
absolute value of the latitude of the capital of the country, scaled to take values 
between 0 and 1. Source (Djankov et al., 2003, from CIA factbook). Ethnic 
fractionalization is computed as one minus the Herfindahl index of ethnic group 
shares. This calculation considers the probability that two persons, randomly chosen, 
from a population belong to different groups (Alesina et al., 2003). 
The estimation procedure deals with a number of problems which could lead to erroneous 
inference with standard procedures. First, weighted probit estimations are used with 
weights correcting deviations of the world value survey sampling from the national 
population’s characteristics. Second, the standard assumption of an independent error 
terms is questionable for observations from an identical country. Unobservable country-
characteristics are likely to lead to residuals being correlated within one country. To cope 
with that problem clustered regression technique is applied where the assumption of 
independent error terms only refers to the across country dimension so that the 
presented inference is robust to within country correlation of error terms. Wave dummies 
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measuring the impact of unobserved time-specific factors are included if they prove to be 
jointly significant at the 5 percent-significance level. 
Specification (1) in Table 3a serves as basis specification and still ignores the country 
specific welfare state proxies. On the basis of 80.000 observations for all four waves the 
significance of sex, marital status and patriotism is confirmed with the expected sign. The 
marginal effects inform about an explanatory variable’s impact on the probability that the 
respondent belongs to the group with high benefit morale. For example, female 
respondents have a four per cent higher probability to associate themselves with a high 
benefit morale compared to male respondents. For married persons this probability 
exceeds that of unmarried by almost five per cent.  
Specification (2) in Table 3a presents a first test of equation (1) by including the long-run 
(20-year-) change in a respondent’s country’s social transfers. In line with expectations 
the impact on benefit morale is significantly negative with a marginal effect of 1.3 per 
cent. Specification (3) includes further country controls with interesting insights such as 
the fact that autonomy of region indeed is associated with substantially higher benefit 
morale and that English legal origin countries are characterized by significantly higher 
benefit morale than French or German legal origin countries. What is, however, essential 
in this augmented estimation is the fact that the Lindbeck variable survives the inclusion 
of further country controls at even larger significance and with an increasing marginal 
effect. Specification (4) finally looks into a possible interaction between the year of birth 
and the development of the welfare state but does not support the idea that generational 
change is the primary channel for the erosion of benefit morale. Table 3b summarizes the 
identical specifications where the focus is now on the long-run (20-year-) change in 
unemployment instead of social transfers with very similar insights: An increase in the 
unemployment rate is also robustly related to lower morale whether numerous further 
country characteristics are included or not. In both cases the augmented specifications 
(columns (3) and (6)) reveal an interesting additional insight about the relative importance 
of age and year of birth. Later birth cohorts are associated with significantly lower levels 
of morale whereas age as such has no effect. This finding corresponds to the descriptive 
insights of figure 3. Furthermore both augmented specifications also show a significantly 
positive effect of employment on morale. 
Robustness checks support the main findings although with qualification with regard to 
the time period. Tables (4a) and (4b) include estimation results for the augmented 
specification for the four waves of the WVS in separation. In these specifications, age and 
year of birth cannot be added in combination since, for the same point in time, both 
variables are perfectly collinear. Here, the significant negative effect of the growth of 
transfers and unemployment on morale characterizes the 1994/1999 and the 1999/2004 
waves whereas the coefficients are insignificant in the earlier waves or even significantly 
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positive in one case (column (8) regression referring to the earliest wave for the change in 
transfers). 
The probit specification does not exploit the full information available from the answer 
scale of the benefit morale question (from 1 “never justifiable” up to 10 “always 
justifiable”). Hence, an ordered probit estimation is added (tables 5a and 5b) as a further 
robustness check. For that answer scale a positive sign of a coefficient is associated with 
a negative impact on morale. The key result, the significant negative impact of a long-run 
increase in transfers or unemployment on morale, is again supported. With regard to the 
individual control variables the fuller exploitation of information leads to more significant 
coefficients: In the ordered probit model confidence in the parliament and income 
influence morale significantly positive. Again legal origin and federalism show up as 
relevant country characterics. 
First of all these regression show that a number of individual and country characteristics 
are associated with benefit morale as expected: Individual characteristics like sex, marital 
status, patriotism exert a robustly significant influence on benefit morale. Many but not all 
regressions also indicate that employment status and confidence in parliament are also 
relevant characteristics in this regard. Among the country controls legal origin and 
decentralization play a role. French (and less robust German) legal origin countries tend 
to be associated with lower morale than English legal origin countries. The idea that 
federal structures foster the acceptance of rules is supported by the fact that participants 
from countries with autonomous regions (according to the classification of the Database 
of Political Institutions, Beck et al., 2001) show higher levels of morale. 
The key finding, however, is that Lindbeck’s worries about “hazardous welfare state 
dynamics” are supported. A country’s welfare state history quantified as the long-run 
increase of transfers or unemployment impacts on the prevalence of welfare state 
relevant social norms. Here the findings are very similar whether regressions are based 
on the change in the transfer-GDP-ratio or on the change in unemployment. Hence 
hypotheses 1 and 2 are supported. The empirical relevance of hypothesis 3 that 
generational change is the main catalyst receives some though no overwhelming support. 
All interactions between year of birth and the change in transfers or unemployment are 
insignificant (columns 4, 7, 18, 21). However, in all augmented regressions which include 
the full set of country controls and are based on the full sample, the year of birth in 
contrast to age is significant and exerts a negative impact on morale (columns (3), (6), 
(17) and (20)). 
22 
Table 3a: Probit regressions for baseline and Δ social spending, dependent variable: “claiming government benefits to 
which you are not entitled is never justifiable” (1) versus other answers (0), full sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coefficient ME Coefficient ME Coefficient ME Coefficient. ME 
Constant -7,1700 13.4716 50.0539*** 11.8642  
Age  0.0175 0.0066  0.0088 0.0032 -0.0097 -0.0035  0.0087 0.0032 
Year of birth  0.0036 0.0014 -0.0066 -0.0024 -0.0251*** -0.0092 -0.0058 -0.0021 
Female  0.1013*** 0.0381  0.0976*** 0.0358  0.0985*** 0.0361  0.0977*** 0.0358 
Married  0.1335*** 0.0505  0.1298*** 0.0478  0.1331*** 0.0490  0.1296*** 0.0477 
Employed  0.0431 0.0162  0.0970*** 0.0357  0.0662*** 0.0243  0.0959*** 0.0353 
Religious -0.0025 -0.0009  0.0105 0.0038  0.0081 0.0030  0.0105 0.0039 
Confidence in Parliament  0.0075 0.0028  0.0285 0.0104  0.0198 0.0073  0.0283 0.0104 
Patriotism  0.1404*** 0.0528  0.1348*** 0.0495  0.1065*** 0.0391  0.1348*** 0.0494 
Income  0.0137 0.0052  0.0100 0.0037  0.0123 0.0045  0.0100 0.0037 
Δ Social security benefits  -0.0343** -0.0126 -0.0463*** -0.0170  0.0412 0.1511 
Year of birth x Δ social spending    -0.0002 -0.0001 
Ethnic fractionalization   -0.3742 -0.1372   
latitude    0.0151 0.0055   
Legal origin: French   -0.3920*** -0.1470   
Legal origin: German   -0.2135*** -0.0799   
Legal origin: Scandinavian   -0.0504 -0.0186   
Tax decentralization    0.0024 0.0009   
Autonomous regions    0.3838*** 0.1320   
Wave dummies included  yes  yes  no  yes  
Pseudo R2  0.0442  0.0559  0.0608  0.0559  
Prob > χ2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Number of observations  83,130  53,529  53,529   53,529  
Weighted probit estimation allowing for country correlation of errors terms; legal origin: omitted dummy is English legal origin. ME: marginal effect. 
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Table 3b: Probit regressions for Δ unemployment, dependent variable: “claiming government benefits to which you are not 
entitled is never justifiable” (1) versus other answers (0), full sample 
 (5) (6) (7) 
 Coefficient ME Coefficient ME Coefficient ME 
Constant -53.1824  31.4310***  -52.2658  
Age  0.0404 0.0147 -0.0005 -0.0002  0.0404 0.0147
Year of birth  0.0270 0.0098 -0.0158*** -0.0058  0.0265 0.0096
Female  0.0936*** 0.0340  0.1083*** 0.0396  0.0935*** 0.0340
Married  0.1515*** 0.0554  0.1320*** 0.0485  0.1515*** 0.0554
Employed  0.0439 0.0160  0.0604*** 0.0222  0.0440 0.0160
Religious  0.0128 0.0046  0.0067 0.0025  0.0129 0.0047
Confidence in Parliament  0.0120 0.0044  0.0144 0.0053  0.0120 0.0044
Patriotism  0.1210*** 0.0440  0.0968*** 0.0354  0.1212*** 0.0440
Income  0.0041 0.0015  0.0134* 0.0049  0.0040 0.0015
Δ Unemployment -0.0375*** -0.0136 -0.0264** -0.0096 -0.2451 -0.0890
Year of birth x Δ unemployment      0.0001 0.0000
Ethnic fractionalization   -0.1005 -0.0368   
Latitude  -0.1424 -0.0521  
Legal origin: French  -0.3830** -0.1428  
Legal origin: German  -0.1290* -0.0479  
Legal origin: Scandinavian   0.0645 0.0234  
Tax decentralization  -0.0005 -0.0002  
Autonomous regions   0.3165** 0.1101  
Wave dummies included  yes  no   yes 
Pseudo R2  0.0499   0.0593   0.0499  
Prob > χ2  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
Number of observations  64,251   62,208   64,251  
Weighted probit estimation allowing for country correlation of errors terms; legal origin: omitted dummy is English legal origin. ME: marginal effect. 
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Table 4a: Probit regressions for Δ social spending, dependent variable: “claiming government benefits to which you are 
not entitled is never justifiable” (1) versus other answers (0), separate waves 
 (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 1981-84 1989-1993 1994-1999 1999-2004 
 Coefficient. ME Coefficient. ME Coefficient. ME Coefficient. ME 
Constant  0.4882***  -0.2292   1.5525***  -0.4893  
Age  0.0168*** 0.0051  0.0138*** 0.0052  0.0177*** 0.0063  0.0147*** 0.0056
Female  0.1358*** 0.0413  0.0715** 0.0268  0.1440*** 0.0510  0.0868*** 0.0332
Married  0.1865*** 0.0578  0.1158*** 0.0436  0.1449*** 0.0516  0.1360*** 0.0522
Employed  0.1506*** 0.0463  0.0306 0.0115  0.0637*** 0.0227  0.0758** 0.0291
Religious  0.0159 0.0048  0.0097 0.0037  0.0062 0.0022  0.0130** 0.0050
Confidence in Parliament  0.0580* 0.0176  0.0341 0.0128 -0.0175 -0.0062  0.0039 0.0015
Patriotism  0.1240*** 0.0377  0.1106*** 0.0415  0.1589*** 0.0564  0.0963*** 0.0369
Income  0.0086 0.0026  0.0053 0.0020  0.0225*** 0.0080  0.0145** 0.0056
Δ Social security benefits  0.0569*** 0.0173 -0.0541 -0.0202 -0.0296*** -0.0105 -0.0760*** -0.0291
Ethnic fractionalization -0.2037 -0.0620 -0.5890 -0.2208  2.0036*** 0.7104 -0.3045 -0.1166
Latitude -1.0511*** -0.3198  0.9229** 0.3460 -4.7431*** -1.6817  0.5952 0.2279
Legal origin: French  0.0823*** 0.0244 -0.2113 -0.0796 -0.2548*** -0.0943 -0.3779*** -0.1455
Legal origin: German -0.2318*** -0.0738 -0.1141 -0.0432  0.5864*** 0.1895 -0.0825 -0.0318
Legal origin: Scandinavian  0.1941*** 0.0563 -0.3262 -0.1263  1.9767*** 0.5254 -0.1112 -0.0430
Tax decentralization -0.0033** -0.0010  0.0060 0.0023 -0.0188*** -0.0067  0.0055 0.0021
Autonomous regions   0.4395** 0.1565   0.4439*** 0.1600
Pseudo R2  0.0806   0.0472   0.0689   0.0661  
Prob > χ2  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
Number of observations  8,871   18,254   8,541   17,863  
Weighted probit estimation allowing for country correlation of errors terms; legal origin: omitted dummy is English legal origin. ME: marginal effect. 
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Table 4b: Probit regressions for Δ unemployment, dependent variable: “claiming government benefits to which you are not 
entitled is never justifiable” (1) versus other answers (0), separate waves 
 (12) (13) (14) (15) 
 1981-84 1989-1993 1994-1999 1999-2004 
 Coefficient. ME Coefficient. ME Coefficient. ME Coefficient. ME 
Constant  1.0834***  -0.2148   1.1304***  -0.9116***  
Age  0.0154*** 0.0050  0.0142*** 0.0053  0.0177*** 0.0063  0.0146*** 0.0056
Female  0.1303*** 0.0424  0.0941*** 0.0351  0.1579*** 0.0561  0.0889*** 0.0340
Married  0.1607*** 0.0531  0.1076*** 0.0403  0.1477*** 0.0527  0.1392*** 0.0534
Employed  0.0882** 0.0289  0.0588 0.0220  0.0586** 0.0209  0.0620** 0.0238
Religious  0.0223*** 0.0073  0.0098 0.0036 -0.0012 -0.0004  0.0119 0.0045
Confidence in Parliament -0.0101 -0.0033  0.0234 0.0087 -0.0044 -0.0016  0.0012 0.0004
Patriotism  0.1075*** 0.0351  0.1078*** 0.0402  0.1375*** 0.0489  0.0820*** 0.0314
Income  0.0120 0.0039  0.0060 0.0022  0.0229*** 0.0081  0.0143** 0.0055
Δ Unemployment -0.0297 -0.0097  0.0256 0.0096 -0.0140*** -0.0050 -0.0999*** -0.0383
Ethnic fractionalization  0.0939 0.0306 -0.6548 -0.2441  1.5947*** 0.5668 -0.2135 -0.0817
Latitude -1.4463*** -0.4717  0.2742 0.1022 -3.7122*** -1.3195  1.1595** 0.4439
Legal origin: French -0.6789** -0.2351 -0.3107* -0.1166   0.1272 0.0485
Legal origin: German -0.3348* -0.1167 -0.0954 -0.0359  0.4355*** 0.1475  0.3448** 0.1267
Legal origin: Scandinavian  0.5438 0.1602 -0.2108 -0.0805  1.4670*** 0.4152  0.0558 0.0213
Tax decentralization -0.0081 -0.0026  0.0068 0.0025 -0.0163*** -0.0058  0.0005 0.0002
Autonomous regions  0.2329 0.0725  0.2044 0.0744 -0.1781** -0.0654  0.3788*** 0.1380
Pseudo R2  0.0864   0.0472   0.0657   0.0714  
Prob > χ2  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
Number of observations  13,935   21,049   9,361   17,863  
Weighted probit estimation allowing for country correlation of errors terms; legal origin: omitted dummy is English legal origin. ME: marginal effect. French legal 
origin dropped in (13) due to missing country observations for that wave. 
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Table 5a: Ordered probit regressions for Δ social spending, dependent variable: “claiming government benefits to which 
you are not entitled is never justifiable” (1) up to “always justifiable” (10) 
 (16) (17) (18) 
 Coefficient ME Coefficient ME Coefficient ME 
Age -0.0109 -0.0007  0.0087 0.0005 -0.0108 -0.0007
Year of birth  0.0030 0.0002  0.0225*** 0.0014  0.0020 0.0001
Female -0.0863*** -0.0054 -0.0846*** -0.0053 -0.0864*** -0.0054
Married -0.1143*** -0.0072 -0.1182*** -0.0075 -0.1140*** -0.0072
Employed -0.0977*** -0.0062 -0.0610** -0.0039 -0.0964*** -0.0061
Religious -0.0130 -0.0008 -0.0127** -0.0008 -0.0131 -0.0008
Confidence in Parliament -0.0541*** -0.0034 -0.0408** -0.0026 -0.0538*** -0.0034
Patriotism -0.1143*** -0.0072 -0.0908*** -0.0057 -0.1142*** -0.0072
Income -0.0145* -0.0009 -0.0167* -0.0011 -0.0145* -0.0009
Δ Social security benefits  0.0392** 0.0025  0.0502*** 0.0032 -0.4792 -0.0301
Year of birth x Δ social spending     0.0003 0.0000
Ethnic fractionalization    0.3757 0.0236   
Latitude  -0.0513 -0.0032  
Legal origin: French   0.4065*** 0.0266  
Legal origin: German   0.1828** 0.0119  
Legal origin: Scandinavian  -0.0006 0.0000  
Tax decentralization  -0.0016 -0.0001  
Autonomous regions  -0.3584** -0.0205  
Wave dummies included  yes   No   yes  
Pseudo R2  0.0287   0.0320   0.0288  
Prob > χ2  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
Number of observations  53,529   53,529   53,529  
Weighted ordered probit estimation allowing for country correlation of errors terms; legal origin: omitted dummy is English legal origin. ME: marginal effect for 
answer category 5. 
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Table 5b: Ordered probit regressions for Δ unemployment, dependent variable: “claiming government benefits to which 
you are not entitled is never justifiable” (1) up to “always justifiable” (10) 
 (19) (20) (21) 
 Coefficient ME Coefficient ME Coefficient ME 
Constant       
Age -0.0344* -0.0021 -0.0015 -0.0001 -0.0344* -0.0022
Year of birth -0.0222 -0.0014  0.0120*** 0.0008 -0.0218 -0.0014
Female -0.0832*** -0.0052 -0.0938*** -0.0060 -0.0831*** -0.0052
Married -0.1349*** -0.0085 -0.1176*** -0.0076 -0.1350*** -0.0085
Employed -0.0479 -0.0030 -0.0548** -0.0035 -0.0480 -0.0030
Religious -0.0155 -0.0010 -0.0109* -0.0007 -0.0156 -0.0010
Confidence in Parliament -0.0347** -0.0022 -0.0345* -0.0022 -0.0348** -0.0022
Patriotism -0.1021*** -0.0064 -0.0822*** -0.0053 -0.1024*** -0.0064
Income -0.0090 -0.0006 -0.0177** -0.0011 -0.0090 -0.0006
Δ Unemployment  0.0397*** 0.0025  0.0277** 0.0018  0.2740 0.0171
Year of birth x Δ unemployment    -0.0001 0.0000
Ethnic fractionalization    0.0809 0.0052  
Latitude   0.0857 0.0055  
Legal origin: French   0.3965** 0.0261  
Legal origin: German   0.0897 0.0058  
Legal origin: Scandinavian  -0.1013 -0.0063  
Tax decentralization   0.0014 0.0001  
Autonomous regions  -0.3040** -0.0180  
Wave dummies included  yes   no   yes  
Pseudo R2  0.0258   0.0311   0.0258  
Prob > χ2  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
Number of observations  64,251   62,208   64,251  
Weighted ordered probit estimation allowing for country correlation of errors terms; legal origin: omitted dummy is English legal origin. ME: marginal effect for 
answer category 5. 
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5 Conclusions 
The presented empirical findings clearly indicate that Assar Lindbeck’s theory on self-
destructive welfare state dynamics has empirical backing. Social norms which safeguard 
the welfare state’s stability and limit its costs appear to be influenced by the welfare 
state’s history. Specifically, transfer expansion or increasing unemployment tend to be 
associated with a larger readiness of the country’s population to cheat on benefits.  
Some remarks on the limits of the presented insights are necessary. Although the 
findings support the view that the welfare state tends to erode benefit morale they do not 
yet allow for a clear identification of exact channels. The hypothesis that generational 
change is an important precondition for the negative ethical influences of the welfare 
state is not supported directly since the interactions of year of births with the welfare state 
proxies have not been significant. However, in a number of regressions the year of birth 
as such showed significance with later birth cohorts showing a larger sympathy for the 
unjustified claim of benefits. However, the question still remains unresolved where this 
deterioration originates from the evolution of the welfare state or from other generation 
specific characteristics which are not covered by the included individual characteristics. 
Both models based on the long-run change in unemployment on the one hand and 
transfers on the other hand have led to very similar results making it hard to discriminate 
between both. This is not surprising given the fact that both transfer growth and 
unemployment increases are mutually interdependent and highly correlated. Hence it is 
not possible to judge from the results whether it is the larger familiarity with 
unemployment (independent from transfer offers) or a larger welfare state generosity 
which is at the heart of the problem. 
The presented empirics with regard to the long-run determinants of benefit morale have 
important implications for the design of welfare state reforms. Furthermore, they highlight 
the risk that conventional empirical approaches to measure the incentive effects of 
welfare state arrangements may underestimate the strength of incentive effects in the 
long-run. 
With regard to welfare state reforms the conclusion is that the large variance in benefit 
morale must not be ignored in the design of reform options for the welfare state. An 
imitation of institutions which have proven viable in countries with high ethical standards 
can fail in a country with low ethical standards. Therefore, different social norms have to 
be taken into account in reflections on imitation strategies based on learning from 
successful countries. A further conclusion is that the problem of a potential “welfare state 
overshoot” as identified theoretically by Lindbeck may indeed be relevant empirically: If 
only short-run incentive effects are accounted for in the decision on the build-up of 
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welfare state arrangements then the long-run costs of the welfare state are 
underestimated. The decision based on the short-run calculus will then be more generous 
than it would be the case if the optimizing calculus was based on a full account of all (also 
the long-run) behavioural reactions which result from the welfare state’s gradual impact 
on social norms. 
Besides these economic policy insights methodological conclusions emerge. Standard 
microeconometric approaches targeted at the quantification of incentive effects are based 
on the implicit assumption of stable social norms. E.g., in the context of labour markets 
normative restrictions with regard to the take-up of social benefits are treated as 
exogenously given. This study stresses the problem that this ceteris paribus assumption 
is empirically not valid. If transfers undermine those norms which support a reluctant take-
up of government benefits then the negative effects of transfers on labour supply are 
more pronounced than it can be measured in the standard microeconometric exercises.  
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Appendix 
Table 1: Variable definitions and sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Age Age in years EWVS 
Year of birth Year of birth EWVS 
Patriotism “Proud of nationality” from “not at 
all” (-4) to “very proud” (-1) 
EWVS 
Employed Full time, part time or self-
employed versus retired, 
housewife, students, unemployed 
or other 
EWVS 
Income Scale from 1(first scale of 
income) to 11 (11th scale of 
income) 
EWVS 
Religious Frequency of attendance of 
religious services from -8 (never) 
to more than once a week (-1) 
EWVS 
Financial satisfaction Scale from 1 (dissatisfied) to 10 
(satisfied) 
EWVS 
Confidence in parliament Scale from “none at all” (-4) to “a 
great deal” (-1) 
EWVS 
Δ Social security benefits Change of social spending over 
20 years in percentage points of 
GDP 
OECD Economic Outlook 
Database 
Δ Unemployment Change of unemployment rate 
over 20 years in percentage 
points 
OECD Economic Outlook 
Database 
Ethnic fractionalization One minus Herfindahl index of 
ethnic group shares 
Alesina et al. (2003) 
Latitude Latitude of country capital Djankov et al. (2003), from CIA 
factbook 
Legal origin Legal origin La Porta et al., 1999 
Tax decentralization Share of regional tax revenues 
from own autonomous taxes and 
total tax reveneu 
Stegarescu (2005) 
Autonomous regions Dummy on existence of 
autonomous regions 
Beck et al. (2001) 
EWVS: European Values Study Foundation and World Values Survey Association (2006). 
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Table 2: Country coverage of WVS over four waves, 
Selection: Industrial countries, answers on benefit morale question available 
Country Nb. of observations Percent of total 
Australia 3,248 2.79 
Austria 2,941 2.53 
Belgium 5,651 4.86 
Canada 4,871 4.19 
Czech republic 6,004 5.17 
Denmark 3,214 2.77 
Finland 2,533 2.18 
France 3,723 3.2 
Greece 1,085 0.93 
Hungary 3,983 3.43 
Iceland 2,571 2.21 
Ireland 3,167 2.73 
Italy 5,265 4.53 
Japan 4,277 3.68 
Republic of Korea 2,166 1.86 
Luxembourg 1,147 0.99 
Mexico 4,987 4.29 
Netherlands 3,211 2.76 
New Zealand 1,149 0.99 
Norway 3,381 2.91 
Poland 4,060 3.49 
Portugal 2,128 1.83 
Slovakia 3,948 3.4 
Spain 9,653 8.31 
Sweden 3,975 3.42 
Switzerland 2,517 2.17 
Turkey 2,213 1.9 
Great Britain 3,619 3.11 
United States 6,822 5.87 
West Germany 5,404 4.65 
East Germany 3,306 2.84 
Total 116,219 100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
